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Abstract 
 
 
The prior studies suggest that there are three kinds of earnings thresholds; first is to 
report a profit; second is to report an increasing in profit, and third is to meet analysts’ 
forecasts. By empirical studies, this paper corroborates evidence that the former two 
kinds of earnings benchmarks (avoidance of losses and earnings decreases) are also 
common existing in the Japanese market. As to the second kind of benchmarks, 
avoiding earnings decrease, are still existing but not such significant as ten years ago. 
The study on the third benchmark is based on the specific Japanese forecasting data. 
Japanese market has the unique forecasting system not as other countries. It is easy 
and convenient to be acquired, so the public treats the managers’ forecasting more 
seriously than analysts forecasting. I focus on the managers’ forecasting as the third 
kind of earnings benchmarks. The result shows that the distributions of earnings 
surprises contain an unusual high frequency of zero and small positive surprises. By 
examining the realization of managers’ forecasting, I concern on the meeting 
forecasting and beating forecasting separately. The findings suggest firms prefer slight 
forecasts exceeding to just meeting. Comparing with the slightly negative earnings 
surprise firms, firms with small positive earnings surprise have significant higher 
discretionary accruals. I also do estimation with the realization of annual report and 
semi-annual report; the results show that firms concern more on realization of 
managers’ forecasting in annual report than in semi-annual report. Additional, I 
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investigate the real activities manipulation of the suspected firm also; the results do 
not significantly show a difference for the firms with slight earnings surprise on the 
using of real earnings management compared with the firms just missing the 
managers’ furcating. However, based on the firm-level full sample, I find the two 
ways earnings management: accruals-based earnings management and real earnings 
management are substitutive. 
  
Key words: earnings benchmarks; earnings management; avoidance of earnings 
decreases and losses; managers’ forecasting; accrual-based earnings management; real 
earnings management 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background of the topic 
Earnings, as a central role of financial report, are always considered as a 
measurment of the enterprise’s financial performance. Financial reporting should 
provide information about an enterprise’s financial performance during a period. 
There are lots of literatures present substantial evidences that managers try to 
manipulate accruals through accounting choices and estimates (Schipper, 1989; Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Fields et al., 2001; Beneish, 2001; 
Habib, 2007). As earnings management research, Schipper (1989) defines earnings 
management as: 
A purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of 
obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, say, merely facilitation the neutral 
operation of the process). Earnings an earnings growth are key components in 
determining firm value. To the extent that earnings management artificially increases 
earnings and earnings growth expectations, earnings management can ultimately 
inflate firm value in order to sustain overvalued equity (Dechow et al. 2000). 
Frequently, managers emphasize the importance of increases in earnings in the 
opening lines of the management discussion section of the annual report. 
The existence of earnings management explains the abnormal earnings distribution. 
There are many headlines and articles in the financial press focusing on these issues. 
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As the prior evidence concluded by the literatures, there are three benchmarks of 
earnings distributions. That the hierarchy of thresholds is first to report a profit, 
second to report an increase in profit, and third to meet analysts’ forecasts (Degeorge 
et al. 1999). The empirical studies document the strong incentives of listed firms to 
avoid earnings decreases and losses. The managers usually report consistently 
increases in the annual report and try their best to maintain consistent increases. Hayn 
(1995) documents that there is a “kink” in the earnings distribution: too few firms 
report small losses and too many firms report small profits. The regularity compelling 
empirical evidence by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provides the evidence that firms 
manage reported earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) provide compelling empirical evidence that earnings decreases and 
losses are frequently managed away. Dechow et al. (2003) provide a multitude of tests 
examining the power of the model to try to explain the kink in the earnings 
distribution. In US, as the analyst forecasting’s accuracy of earnings is increasing, and 
the public tends to pay more attention on the analyst forecasting; in the middle of 
1990s, the analyst forecasting instead of the former two kinds of earnings benchmarks, 
is becoming the most important threshold of earnings (Brown et al. 2005). If the firms 
achieve to realize positive earnings surprise, the stock price increases immediately. 
Otherwise, the stock price declines significantly.  
1.2 Method of earnings management 
  As the method of earnings management, the prior literature present evidences that 
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managers take advantage of the accounting discretion in GAAP to manipulate 
accruals through accounting choices and estimates, which is been seen as the 
accrual-based earnings management. Generally speaking, the researches on 
accrual-based earnings management usually assume that the earnings management 
only effects on the accruals in specific period by changing the accounting methods, 
hardly has influence on operating cash flow. That is the manipulation of accruals 
occurs in this period will be smoothed soon or later in the future fiscal period. For 
example, changing the depreciation method for fixed assets and the estimate for 
provision for doubtful accounts can bias reported earnings in a particular direction. 
The studies on accruals based earnings management use discretionary accruals to test 
the manipulation of earnings, that widespread during previous decades. There are 
many research examines the specification and power of detecting discretionary 
accruals. Jones and modified Jones models are wildly used in former studies as the 
approach to examine discretionary accruals; in 2005, considering the firms with 
extreme performance are also likely to engage in earnings management, Kothari et al. 
conduct the performance matched discretionary accrual measures as a new 
measurement to detect earnings management. Although, the performance matching 
cannot solve all the problems arising by the conventional discretionary accrual models, 
the ROA is considered as an additional controls on estimated discretionary accruals 
systematically, and more specified and powerful at estimating discretionary accruals. 
Dechow et al. 2012 provides a new approach to test for accrual-based earnings 
management. The approach exploits the inherent property of accrual accounting that 
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any accrual-based earnings management in one period must reverse in another period. 
If the researcher has priors concerning the timing of the reversal, incorporating these 
priors can significantly improve the power and specification of tests for earnings 
management. Since earnings are the sum of accruals and operating cash flow, earnings 
can be manipulated through not only accruals but also operating cash flow. In fact, the 
studies focus on real earnings management grows rapidly in recent years. Not as 
accrual-based earnings management, the real earnings management is that the 
managers exploit business activities to alter reported earnings by adjusting the timing 
and scale. It is defined by Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) as the changes of the timing 
or structuring of real business transactions to alter earnings, implying that the changes 
of real transactions deviate from the optimal plan of actions and thus impose a real 
cost to the firm. Roychowdhury (2006) defines real earnings management as 
“departures from normal operational practices, motivated by managers’ desire to 
mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals 
have been met in the normal course of operations. In other words, the managers could 
use real activities manipulation and accruals-based earnings management as 
substitutes in managing earnings.  
1.3 Research ideas and structure 
1.3.1 Research ideas 
  The motivation and purpose of this paper is to figure out the situation of earnings 
benchmarks recently in Japan. Specifically, the managers’ forecasting data with a 
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considerably long history is the unique mandatory disclosure forecasting data in the 
world. It is rare to consider this forecasting as the third earnings benchmarks, which 
makes the topic with a certain novelty. Then, focusing on the realization of managers’ 
forecasting and detailed into the method of realization of forecasting also made the 
paper relatively novel. First, consistent with previous research, I use the same 
definition about the earnings benchmarks to show the distributions of change in 
earnings and earnings contain an anomalous high frequency of zero and small positive 
intervals and an anomalous low frequency of small negative intervals. Specifically, 
using the unique Japanese managers’ forecasting (required by Japanese stock 
exchange mandatory) data, I provide distributions of meeting or beating managers’ 
forecasting. It displays an unusually high frequency of zero and small positive 
earnings surprises also, like the analysts’ forecasting in other countries. By examining 
the realization of managers’ forecasting, I focus on the meeting forecasting and 
beating forecasting separately. The findings suggest that the firms prefer exceeding 
slightly forecasts than just meeting the earnings forecasting. Comparing with the 
slightly negative earnings surprise firms, the firms with small positive earnings 
surprise have significant higher discretionary accruals. Then I also estimate the 
realization of annual report and semi-annual/the third quarterly report; the results 
show that firms concern more on realization of managers’ forecasting in annual report 
than in semi-annual report. According to the changes of discloser requirement, I 
examine the accuracy of managers’ forecasting, and the results shows that after 2003, 
the requirement of quarterly earnings briefing, the difference between managers’ 
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forecasting and actual earnings tends to subside. With respect to earnings management, 
I further investigate the real earnings management exclusively on the suspected firms, 
which with slight earnings surprise, to clarify if the firms also engaged in real 
earnings management to realize the forecasting. The result shows that, unlike 
accrual-based earnings management, the firms with small earnings surprise firstly 
employ the accrual approach to manipulate their earnings, but not the real earnings 
management, which is relatively costly. Although it was revealed in previous studies 
that accrual-based and real activities earnings management are substitutive, I find, on 
the firms with slight earnings surprise, say, the suspected firms, the negative 
correlation between accrual-based and real activities earnings management tends to be 
larger than the general firms. As we know, the negative correlation itself, between 
accrual-based and real activities earnings management, to some degree represents that 
there exists earning management in all firms sample. If in this case, I can suppose in 
the suspected firms, such negative correlation should be highlighted since these firms 
have higher incentive to do earnings management. Estimated results prove this 
assumption. 
1.3.2 Result and contributions 
  This paper presents the distribution of earnings benchmarks of Japanese market. 
Moreover, the paper focuses on the third kinds of the earnings-managers’ forecasting, 
which is unique in Japan. The results show that as the represent of the fist kind of 
earnings benchmark, the distribution of changes in net income shows discontinuity 
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around zero, which reflect the avoiding of earnings decreases. But comparing with the 
result based on prior studies, this benchmark is still existed but not so significant as 
before. As the second kind of earnings benchmarks, the net income represents the 
avoidance of losses. The result shows a single-peaked, bell-shaped distribution with 
an irregularity near zero, which is consistent with earnings management. Earnings 
losses, which just less than zero occur less frequently than would be expected given 
the smoothness of the remainder of the distribution. This irregularity phenomenon is 
also confirmed by the statistical tests. Mainly, the third earnings benchmarks in Japan, 
not as the same as other countries, is been seem as the forecasting given by managers 
themselves. The results focus on this part reveal the significant irregularity 
distribution as former two. With a close look of the result, I classify the firms’ 
realization of managers’ forecasting which just near the zero into three groups to 
clarify the earnings management among these groups. The firms with slight positive 
forecasting realization shows higher inclination to engage in earnings management 
than the group with small negative forecasting realization. Then, considering the 
method of earnings management, I also checked the earnings management by real 
activities. The result shows significant negative relationship between accruals based 
and real earnings management.  
  This paper provides the study on earnings benchmarks recently. The managers 
forecasting data, the unique forecasting data is treated as the third kinds of earnings 
benchmarks, also make the study much more interesting than the traditional definition 
of earnings benchmarks. Focusing on the realization of managers’ forecasting, it is 
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also interesting to classify the firms near zero into three groups: the firms with slight 
positive earnings surprise, slight negative earnings surprise and zero earnings surprise. 
There are few research studies on the relationship between different methods of 
earnings management in Japan; this paper finds that the two methods of earnings 
management are substitutive with significant negative relationship. 
1.3.3 Structure 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  
Section 2 reviews the related research to clear the developing of this research issue. 
Section 3, the research issues present the hypotheses, sample selection and the 
empirical regression model used to examine the relation between managers’ earnings 
forecasting and discretionary accruals. Next, the real activities manipulation as the 
other strategy of earnings management is also been inspected.  
Section 4 presents and discusses empirical results. 
Section 5 concludes the implications of the findings and suggesting ideas for future 
research. This section firstly summarizes the conclusions, and based on the 
conclusions, I point out the future work needs to be conducted. 
2 Literature 
Previous studies support the avoidance of earnings decreases and avoidance of 
losses. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) suggest that 8% to 12% of the firms with small 
pre-managed earnings decreases exercise discretion to report earnings increases. 
Similarly, 30% to 44% of the firms with slightly negative pre-manages earnings 
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exercise discretion to report positive earnings. Ke et al. (2002) investigate the validity 
of the earnings management explanation by examining the stream of earnings changes 
and the components of these changes for public vs. privately held bank holding 
companies (banks). They conclude that after controlling for potential differences 
between the operations of public and private banks, the public banks are significantly 
less likely than private banks to report small declines in earnings. Myers et al. (2007) 
provide evidence that earnings momentum-the tendency of firms to report several 
years of consecutive increases in quarterly EPS-is relatively commonplace, much 
more so than would be expected by chance. They interpret this as prima facie 
evidence of earnings management in the spirit of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and 
Degeorge et al. (1999). Degeorge et al. (1999) identify one additional earnings 
benchmark. They examine the relative importance of three quarterly earnings 
thresholds managers seek to achieve, and conclude that managers order their earnings 
thresholds as follows: (1) avoid quarterly losses; (2) avoid quarterly earnings 
decreases, and (3) avoid negative quarterly earnings surprises. They suggest that 
avoiding losses is the most important threshold to achieve based on their conditional 
analyses, but their unconditional results reveal that avoiding earnings decreases is the 
most important threshold. From their evidences, avoiding a negative earnings surprise 
is the least important threshold that robust to their use of both conditional and 
unconditional methodologies. Brown and Caylor (2005) find that this hierarchy has 
reversed in recent years (1996-2002). It means managers seek to avoid negative 
quarterly earnings surprises more than to avoid either quarterly losses or quarterly 
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earnings decreases. Barua et al. (2006) extend Brown (2001) by documenting that the 
differential propensity to achieve earnings benchmarks by profitable and 
non-profitable firms result from differential accruals management behavior. The 
finding is that firms with profits before accruals management are more likely than 
firms with losses before accruals management to have pre-managed earnings below 
both analysts’ forecasts and prior period earnings and reported earnings above these 
benchmarks. Accruals represent a key aspect of mandatory reporting. Prior studies 
suggest that investors and financial analysts fail to fully understand the implications 
of accruals for future earnings (Sloan 1996; Bradshaw et al. 2001). Ota (2006) 
provides that meeting the managers’ forecasting are significant relative to stock price 
than other variables. Gong et al. (2009) investigate the association between errors in 
management forecasts of sub sequent year earnings and current year accruals. In an 
uncertain operating environment, managers’ assessments of their firms’ business 
prospects are imperfect. They hypothesize that management earnings forecasts exhibit 
greater optimism (pessimism) when accruals are relatively high (low). The finding 
shows a positive association between management earnings forecast errors and 
accruals. Shuto (2010) provide that consistent with US evidences, there are the same 
three kinds of benchmarks in Japanese market. He reports the avoidance of earnings 
decreases and losses is also exist in Japanese market, and comparing with the US 
firms, the Japanese show higher inclination to avoid earnings decreases and losses. 
The firms both manipulate their earnings and managers’ expectations to achieve 
earnings benchmarks. Prior studies have proposed various incentive-related factors 
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that could motivate managers to bias their earnings forecasts to inflate market 
earnings expectations (Frost 1997; Koch 2002; Rogers et al. 2006), deter potential 
industry entrants (Newman and Sansing 1993), facilitate security issuance (Frankel et 
al. 1995; Lang et al. 2000), improve trading profitability (Aboody and Kasznik 2000; 
Noe 1999; Rogers and Stocken 2005), or reduce expected legal costs (Skinner 1997; 
Baginski et al. 2002; Rogers and Stocken 2005). Despite these studies, little research 
has examined the relation between mandated reported managers’ forecasting and 
accrual-based/real earnings management. 
  With considering the method of earnings management, the extensive research on 
earnings management largely focuses on accrual-based earnings management 
(Schipper, 1989; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Fields et al. 2001). The literature 
investigate the manipulation of real transaction to distort earnings are less. The 
prevalence of real earnings management as a tool to manipulate earnings was not well 
understood until recently. Graham et al (2005) survey more than 400 executives and 
document. They found strong evidence the managers are willing to engage in real 
activities to manage reported earnings. In order to meet the earnings target, 80% of 
the surveyed executives would like to reduce expenditure on R&D and advertising. 55% 
said that they would like to postpone new project to meet an earnings target, even if 
such delay caused a small loss in firm value. Roychowdhury (2006) provide evidence 
suggesting that managers avoid reporting annual losses or missing analyst forecasts 
by manipulating sales, reducing discretionary expenditures, and overproducing 
inventory to decrease the cost of goods sold, all of which are deviations from 
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otherwise optimal operational decisions, with the intention of biasing earnings upward. 
The research starts to examine the consequence of real activities manipulation 
recently. Bhojral et al. (2009) documents that firms that beat analyst forecasts by 
using real an accrual earnings management have worse operating performance and 
stock market performance in the subsequent three years than firms that miss analyst 
forecasts without earnings management. Gunny (2010) finds that, not consistent with 
the result, the firms that just meet earnings benchmarks by using real earnings 
management have better operating performance in the subsequent three year than 
firms do not engage in real activities and miss or just meet earnings benchmarks. 
Some literatures examine the impact of the costs of accrual-based earnings 
management on the choice of earnings management strategies. Cohen et al. (2008) 
focus on one cost of accrual-based earnings management, that is, the passage of SOX. 
The results show that after the passage of SOX, accrual-based earnings management 
declines, but real earnings management manipulation increases. Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010) examine several costs of accrual-based earnings management using SEO firms 
as samples. They show that there is a positively related to the tendency to use real 
activities manipulation in the year of a SEO. Zang (2012) suggest that the managers 
trade off the two earnings management methods based on their relative costs and that 
managers adjust the level of adjust the level of accrual-based earnings management 
according to the level of real activities manipulation realized. He documents the 
findings consistent with managers using accrual-based earnings management and real 
activities manipulation as substitutes. 
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  A few prior studies examine how managers use multiple accounting and operating 
measures to achieve one or more goals. Barton (2001) suggests that the two activities 
are used as substitutes, as evidence by the negative relation between the two after 
controlling for the desired level of earnings volatility. Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) 
find a similar negative relation, but only in the fourth quarter. Badertscher (2011) find 
that managers engage in accruals management in the early stages of overvalued before 
moving to real transactions management, in order to sustain their overvalued equity; 
and real activities in later years, non-GAAP earnings management as a last resort. 
There is few research investigate the firms use multiple strategies to achieve earnings 
benchmark in Japan.  
3 Research issues 
3.1 Introduction of earnings briefings 
  The paper details the third kinds of earnings benchmarks- managers’ forecasting, 
which is mandatory reported for a long time of Japanese market. Because the prior 
studies based on other countries data have shown that the third earnings benchmark 
had preceded over former two benchmarks, became the most important earnings 
benchmark, the paper investigate the unique mangers’ forecasting data to illustrate the 
specific Japanese benchmark. In Japan, not like other countries, a unique forecasting 
date is available disclosed by the managers themselves, which is called “earnings 
briefings” (決算短信 in Japanese). From 1974, required by the stock exchanges of 
Japan, the earnings briefings are asked to disclose accounting information and report 
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to the public. Earnings briefing as a unique policy of Japan, is lasting for such a long 
time that investors know well about it. Almost every listed firm’s earnings briefing is 
available from the homepage of the firm. So as a kind of accounting information, it is 
so convenient to be obtained and plays an important role for investment decisions 
without any cost to be get. As a source of earnings disclosure, the earnings briefings 
not only contain the actual accounting information in the fiscal period, but also have 
the forecasting information of next period given by the managers. Different with other 
market, the managers’ forecasting is mandatory published, not voluntary in Japan. 
Manager, as the insider, seems to be less information asymmetry and more familiar 
with the internal situation of the firm, so that the managers’ forecasting should be 
more accurately than other forecasting given by analysts.  
The earnings briefing has made some changes from publishing. Before 2003, there 
are annual earnings briefing and semi-annual earnings briefing. According to annual 
earnings briefing, it contains the forecasting data of the next semi-annual earnings and 
forecasting earnings at the end of next fiscal year also; semi-annual earnings briefing 
contains the forecasting information in the end of the fiscal year. Along with more 
inside information are required by the investors and market, the quarterly earnings 
briefings are asked publishing mandatory after 2003. It means, generally speaking, 
there are 4 earnings briefings in one year: the annual one and 3 quarterly briefings. In 
annual and 1st quarterly earnings briefing, managers’ forecasting earnings at next 
semi-annual and next annual are reported. As for the 2nd and 3rd quarterly earnings 
briefings, only the end of fiscal years’ earnings is required to be published. The 
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managers’ forecasting of sales, ordinary income and net income are available in the 
earnings briefings. In addition, if the firms indeed there would be a divergence 
between accrual and forecasting earnings, the amended forecasting could be made in 
next earnings briefings, or publishing a notice about revisal earnings forecasting. 
There is an extent about amending the forecasting, as for sales, the firms could revise 
the forecasting from -5% to 5%; Ordinary income and net income could be modified 
from -10% to 15%. The picture shows the policy of reporting earnings briefings. 
 
  Figure 1. Manager’s forecasting disclosure 
 
3.2 Changes of earning briefing disclosure 
After 2003, as the frequency of earnings briefing publishing was increasing from 
twice a year to four times a year, that is, the manger could revise their forecasting two 
more times than before in a certain range. I assume the managers’ forecasting should 
Annual earnings briefing 
1st quarterly earnings briefing 
2nd quarterly earnings briefing 
 
3rd quarterly earnings briefing 
 
Next Annual earnings briefing 
 
Earnings forecasting 
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be much more accurate than before, since the forecasting disclosure in the third 
quarterly earnings briefing could be modified nearly in the end of the fiscal year. The 
regression followed is the test to examine if the forecasting data after 2003 is 
becoming more accurate comparing the actual data. 
AbsFERRs=a0+a1*POST+e 
AbsFERRs refers to the absolute value of earnings surprise, that equal to actual 
earnings minus forecasting value; and POST is a dummy variable equal to 1 if year 
after 2002 and equal to 0 if year before 2003. The slope coefficient from the 
regression shows the changes after passage of quarterly earnings briefing. Results 
with firm fixed effects are shown in the Table 1. Significant coefficient in POST is 
presented, suggesting my assumption is supported, that managers’ forecasting 
becomes much more accurate after 2003 than before. 
 AbsFERRs 
intercept 0.011***(38.75) 
POST -0.007***(-22.75) 
R2 0.054 
Obs. 10434 
*** means significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses development 
The examination of earnings benchmarks are divided into two parts. The first part 
is to investigate that if the avoiding of earnings decreases and losses, which been 
treated as former two kinds of earnings benchmarks still exist in the market, and 
whether there is any changes in recent years. The second part mainly focuses on the 
meeting or beating managers’ forecasting, the unique forecasting in Japan. Because it 
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is not usual to consider the managers’ forecasting as the third kinds of earning 
benchmarks, this paper provides much more detail statistic analyst in this part 
comparing with the former two.  
As the last kinds of earnings benchmarks, I estimate suspects firms are firm-year 
just beating/meeting the managers’ forecasting. Firstly, I estimate the accrual-based 
earnings management, which impacts reported earnings in a more immediate and 
certain manner. In addition, unlike accrual-based earnings management, I also study 
on the real activities manipulation, which distorts earnings by executing transactions 
differently. Last, I compare and conclude the three kinds of earnings benchmarks in 
Japanese market. Consistent with prior studies, I argue that managers still adjust their 
earning to avoid earnings decreases and losses based on the recently evidences. But in 
recently, as all knows, the economic in Japan is no longer flourishing as before. Many 
firms are facing an extremely tough time, so that the most crucial thing is to survival 
and at least to make some profit. My argument does not imply that the smoother 
earnings are not existed, but the prevalence of avoiding earnings decreases is not so 
significant as before. Thus, the argument is formalized in the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Earnings are managed to avoid earnings decrease, but not significant as 
avoidance losses. 
 
H2: Earnings are managed to avoid losses. 
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In part two, I focus on the earnings forecasting realization. The managers claim 
they seek to meet or beat quarterly earnings benchmarks are to build credibility with 
capital markets and to maintain or increase their firms’ stock prices (Graham et al. 
2004). According to the two reasons to expect management of forecasts to sometimes 
result in earnings that slightly exceed forecasts. First, there may be incremental 
benefits to beating rather than just meeting analyst forecasts. Second, because 
earnings outcomes are to some extent uncertain, firm may target small positive rather 
than zero, earnings surprise to reduce the risk of reporting a negative earnings surprise 
(Degeorge et al. 1999). Although, the managers’ forecasting is not as the same as the 
analysts’ forecasting, actually it attracts much more attention in Japanese market. I 
investigate the firms which have small positive earnings surprise as beating managers’ 
forecasting, and argue that comparing with the firms have slight negative earnings 
that just missing the forecasting benchmarks, the firms which beating managers’ 
forecasting should have significant higher discretionary accruals. I formulate my 
hypotheses as follows: 
 
H3: Earnings are managed to meet or beat managers’ forecasting. 
 
H4: The firms with small positive earnings surprise have higher discretionary accruals 
than the firms with small negative earnings surprise. 
 
H5: The firms with zero earnings surprise have higher discretionary accruals than the 
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firms with small negative earnings surprise. 
 
Because of the limitation of the database, though the earnings briefings are reported 
twice or four times in a year during my research period, I do not have every disclosure 
of earnings briefings in the fiscal year. Only the semi-annual (before 2003), the third 
quarterly (after 2003) and annual earnings briefings are obtained. Considering that the 
bulk of earnings management occurs mainly in the last days of each fiscal year for 
meeting mangers’ objectives (Gu et al. 2003), I also argue that the firms should treat 
the annual report more seriously than the semi-annual/quarterly report. It means the 
firms prefer realizing the managers' forecasting in the end of fiscal year rather than in 
the semi/the third quarterly fiscal year. So the next hypothesis is formulated as bellow: 
 
H6: More firms realize the managers’ forecasting in the annual report than in the 
semi-annual/the third quarterly report. 
 
  Considering the earnings management strategies, the real activities manipulation 
can also be taken advantage of a tool to manipulate earnings, so that the suspect firms 
maybe engage in real activities manipulation at the same time when they already 
manipulated earnings by accruals. Based on the assuming, next, I focus on the real 
earnings management based on the suspect fire-year. The next hypothesis is raised as 
bellow: 
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H7: The firms with small positive earnings surprise have higher inclination to engage 
in real activities manipulation than the firms with small negative earnings surprise.  
 
3.4 Sample selection 
Data for the samples are obtained from Nikkei-needs. Managers’ forecasting data is 
taken from Nikkei economic electronic databank system. In the first part, the sample I 
selected for examining the avoiding earnings decreases and loss is from 2001 to 2011, 
excluding financial institutions. The representation of avoiding earnings decreases is 
the changes in annual net income (net income in t period minus net income in t-1 
period) divided by asset in t-2 period. The final sample contains 34561 observations. 
The net income in period t scaled by asset in t-1 indicates the avoidance of losses. 
There are 35338 observations are obtained. As managers’ forecasting, the realization 
of forecasting is be calculated by forecast errors (FERR), that is, actual earnings 
subtract forecasting earnings in t period divided by asset in t-1. Cause of the limitation 
of the database, the annual forecasting data is available from 2001 to 2010; the 
semi-annual/the third quarterly forecasting data is from 2001 to 2009, excluding the 
financial firms, the firms' fiscal year not in March, singular values and unavailable 
observations in the regressions. 
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3.5 Statistical analysis 
3.5.1 Analysis on earnings decreases and losses 
I start from the examination of the two former earnings benchmarks. To test the 
statistical significance of avoiding earnings decreases and losses, I followed the 
approaches of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) that firstly under the null hypothesis of 
no earnings management, the distributions of earnings changes, earnings and forecast 
errors are smooth. Second, I present the statistical test to examine the hypotheses. 
Table 1 (Panel A) shows descriptive statistics for the earnings changes variable. 
 
 Panel B is the descriptive statistics of earnings. The number of available 
observations increases per year, excluding 2011. The reason is that the database only 
updates the data until Mar. 2011, and Mar. is the end of fiscal year of most Japanese 
firms, so the figure is not increasing in the last year of observation. But obviously, it is 
already including the majority of listed firms. 
Panel A Avoidance of earnings decreases 
Year N Mean Std.Dev 25% 50% 75% 
2001 2800 0.008 0.159 -0.015 0.002 0.020 
2002 2795 -0.000 0.198 -0.023 -0.002 0.014 
2003 3081 0.021 0.237 -0.007 0.005 0.025 
2004 3209 0.031 0.537 -0.001 0.009 0.027 
2005 3255 0.017 0.145 -0.005 0.006 0.023 
2006 3294 0.012 0.157 -0.009 0.004 0.021 
2007 3329 0.003 0.133 -0.009 0.004 0.019 
2008 3352 -0.010 0.111 -0.020 -0.002 0.010 
2009 3366 -0.018 0.164 -0.044 -0.014 0.002 
2010 3376 0.020 0.096 -0.008 0.008 0.035 
2011 2704 0.016 0.083 -0.007 0.006 0.027 
Total 34561 
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Panel B Avoidance of losses 
Year N Mean Std.Dev 25% 50% 75% 
2001 2952 0.009 0.382 0.000 0.016 0.041 
2002 3081 0.006 0.166 -0.007 0.011 0.033 
2003 3205 0.022 0.175 0.003 0.016 0.040 
2004 3274 0.038 0.281 0.009 0.024 0.051 
2005 3294 0.038 0.122 0.012 0.029 0.056 
2006 3336 0.033 0.316 0.012 0.031 0.060 
2007 3359 -0.037 0.089 0.013 0.031 0.058 
2008 3365 0.019 0.096 0.006 0.024 0.051 
2009 3376 -0.006 0.109 -0.02 0.009 0.030 
2010 3384 0.009 0.102 0.002 0.017 0.038 
2011 2712 0.022 0.079 0.007 0.022 0.043 
Total 35338 
 
  The panel C and D are the descriptive statistics for realization of managers’ 
forecasting in annual or semi-annual report, based on sale, ordinary profits and net 
income separately. The mean and median values of forecasting realization are 
primarily, but not exclusively, positive throughout the sample period. 
  Then I graphical evidence in the histograms of the empirical distributions of scaled 
earnings changes. Fig.2 is the histogram of the scaled earnings change variable and 
the histogram interval widths are 0.00025. Each interval is defined to include the 
lower boundary and exclude the upper boundary. The range of earnings changes is 
from -0.01 to +0.01. The figure shows a discontinuous distribution of changes in 
earnings intervals. The distribution displays that earnings changes slightly greater 
than zero occur much more frequently than would be expected. Moreover, the 
distribution is abnormal around zero but not extremely significant as the displays of 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Shuto (2010, using the Japanese data 1976-2000). 
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It is said that the firm still try to avoid earnings decreases but not so prevailing. The 
result is clear from Fig.2 that, avoidance of earnings decreases still exist, but not such 
significant as before from visual, which consistent with H1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel 
C 
Managers’ Forecasting in Annual Report 
Sale Ordinary Profit Net Income 
Year N Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev 
2001 1958 -0.006 0.078 1956 -0.002 0.017 1957 -0.005 0.087 
2002 2061 -0.014 0.061 2059 -0.002 0.016 2061 -0.008 0.025 
2003 2171 0.000 0.032 2168 0.001 0.007 2170 -0.001 0.013 
2004 2268 0.000 0.073 2267 0.004 0.015 2267 0.000 0.010 
2005 2369 0.003 0.058 2369 0.013 0.027 2331 0.001 0.008 
2006 2496 0.005 0.040 2466 0.001 0.014 2467 0.000 0.021 
2007 2649 0.006 0.082 2637 0.001 0.010 2637 0.000 0.014 
2008 2737 -0.001 0.065 2737 0.002 0.133 2737 0.001 0.134 
2009 2777 -0.007 0.038 2777 0.000 0.016 2777 -0.002 0.024 
2010 2794 -0.013 0.116 2795 0.002 0.035 2794 -0.004 0.057 
Total 24280 24231 24198 
Panel 
D 
Managers’ Forecasting in Semi-Annual/the third quarterly Report 
Sale Ordinary Profit Net Income 
Year N Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev 
2001 1925 -0.019 0.046 1923 -0.005 0.017 1925 -0.007 0.020 
2002 2032 -0.001 0.039 2030 0.000 0.008 2031 0.000 0.008 
2003 2131 0.000 0.020 2131 0.000 0.007 2131 0.000 0.005 
2004 2216 0.002 0.017 2216 0.001 0.004 2216 0.001 0.003 
2005 2324 0.002 0.019 2324 0.001 0.005 2324 0.001 0.006 
2006 2457 0.002 0.016 2457 0.001 0.004 2457 0.001 0.004 
2007 2605 0.001 0.018 2604 0.001 0.005 2605 0.000 0.005 
2008 2683 -0.001 0.022 2683 0.000 0.006 2683 0.000 0.007 
2009 2707 -0.004 0.026 2705 0.000 0.013 2705 -0.001 0.014 
Total 21080 21073 21077 
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Fig.2. Earnings Change 
 
Changes of net income divided by Asset in last year. 
The distribution interval widths are 0.00025. 
The range is from -0.01 to +0.01. 
 
Fig.3 shows the empirical distribution of annual net income standard by asset in last 
period. The width of the histogram is 0.0015625 from -0.05 to +0.075. The histogram 
shows a single-peaked, bell-shaped distribution with an irregularity near zero which is 
consistent with earnings management to avoid losses. Earnings slightly less than zero 
occurs less frequently and the frequency of earnings that slightly greater than zero is 
extremely higher than expected. That is, there are few firms report slightly loss, and 
there are too much firms claim the slightly profit. Comparing with the distribution of 
earnings changes, the phenomenon is much more obviously than the distribution of 
earnings changes. Consistent with prior studies, from Fig.3, that the strong incentive 
to avoid losses leads to a strong effect of earnings management in the intervals close 
to zero relevant to H2. 
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Fig.3. Earnings 
 
Net income divided by Asset in last year. 
The distribution interval widths are 0.0015625. 
The range is from -0.05 to +0.075. 
 
The standardized difference for an interval is the difference between the observed 
and expected number of observations in the interval, standardized by the estimated 
standard deviation of the difference. Under the null hypothesis, the standardized 
differences are approximately normal, with a 0 mean and standard deviation of 1. I 
focus on the standardized differences of two intervals immediately close to zero. The 
earnings changes intervals are [0, 00025) and [-0.00025, 0); the earnings intervals are 
[0, 0.0015625) and [-0.0015625, 0). The table 2 (Panel A) is the test of standardized 
differences of changes in earnings and earnings. 
 
Table 2 (Panel A) 
 Tested Intervals Other Intervals 
Interval 
immediately 
left of 0 
Internal 
immediately 
right of 0 
Average Mean Min. Max. 
∆NI -3.246*** 3.052*** -0.002 -0.040 -2.543 2.313 
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NI -13.141*** 5.797*** 0.006 -0.034 -2.014 2.494 
***means significant at 0.01 level. 
 
The findings prove the evidence of irregularity distribution of the histograms above. 
The standardized differences of the interval immediately to the right and left next to 
zero of earnings changes and earnings are very significant. Thus, the abnormal 
distribution around zero apparent in Fig.2 and Fig.3 are statistically significant. 
As examining the frequency of earnings management, the distribution of earnings 
changes and earnings would be approximately symmetric. So the right half of the 
empirical distribution is largely unaffected by earnings management to avoid earnings 
decreases and losses by assuming that in the absence of earnings management. The 
difference between the expected and the observed number reflects the frequency that 
firms engaged in earnings management. The distribution of earnings changes in Fig.2 
would be symmetric around 0.00025, and the distribution of earnings would be 
symmetric around 0.009375 in Fig.3. Table 2 (Panel B) shows the result of the 
estimates about the frequency of firms engaged in earnings management. 
 
Table 2 (Panel B) 
∆NI NI Difference/Total 
(%) 
Difference/Expected 
No. (%) 
Observed 
No. 
Expected 
No. 
Observed 
No. 
Expected 
No. 
∆NI NI ∆NI NI 
323 430 390 1655 3.09 3.58 24.88 76.44 
696 838 822 3336 4.16 7.11 17.18 75.36 
1413 1735 1570 6486 9.34 13.91 18.56 75.79 
Earnings changes (∆NI): The three intervals of increasing width near zero are 
(-0.0005, 0), (-0.001, 0) and (-0.002, 0). The estimates for the three increasingly broad 
intervals are (0.00025, 0.00075), (0.00025, 0.00125) and (0.00025, 0.00225). 
Earnings (NI): The three intervals of increasing width near zero are (-0.003125, 0), 
(-0.00625, 0) and (-0.0125, 0). The estimates for the three increasingly broad intervals 
are (0.009375, 0.0125), (0.009375, 0.0140625) and (0.009375, 0.0203125). 
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According to the finding in Table 2, there are 17% to 25% firms engaged into 
earnings management to avoid earnings decreases. As the frequency of earnings 
management to avoid losses, the percentage is from 75% to 76%. It speaks a directly 
to the H2 that avoidance of losses is commonplace. In sum, based on the same 
estimation, the avoidance of losses is much more prevalence than avoiding earnings 
decreases in recent years, which supported H1 that earnings are managed to avoid 
earnings decrease, but not significant as avoidance losses. 
3.5.1.1 Examining the way to avoid losses  
Further, based on the finding that avoiding losses are extremely significant, I focus 
on avoidance of losses because the evidence above shows a more concentrated effect 
for management to avoid losses than for management to avoid earnings decreases. I 
focus on three subjects: working capital accruals, extraordinary item and operating 
cash flow. The definitions of these subjects are as follows: 
Working Capital Accruals = Notes and Accounts Receivable-Trade + Inventories + 
Notes and Accounts Payable-Trade + Accrued Consumption Taxes; 
 
Extraordinary Items = Extraordinary Income - Extraordinary Loss; 
 
CFO = Operating cash flow  
I divided the firm-year based on these subjects into several portfolios. The portfolio 
boundaries are defined relative to 0: the first portfolio right of 0 consists of the 1000 
smallest positive earnings observations; the second portfolio right of zero consists of 
the 1000 next smallest positive earnings, and so on. The Fig.4, Fig.5 and Fig.6 show 
the percentage distribution of these three subjects. 
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Fig.4. Working capital accruals 
 
 
Fig.5. Extraordinary items 
 
 
Fig.6. CFO 
 
The portfolio boundaries are defined relative to 0: the first portfolio right of 0 consists 
of the 1000 smallest positive earnings observations; the second portfolio right of zero 
consists of the 1000 next smallest positive earnings, and so on. 
 
As showing in the Fig.4, each percentage of working capital accruals present the 
increasing trend of the portfolio that just at the right side near 0. That is, the firms just 
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at the right side of 0 may manipulate their working capital to avoid losses. From Fig.5, 
it is shown that at the left side of 0, except the 90% line, the other lines are negative. It 
deserves to be concerned that for the 10% line, the extraordinary item is extremely 
negative, it suggests firms already facing a loss without possibility to reverse, may 
tend to choose to “take a big bath”. Fig.6 shows the distribution of CFO; there is no 
obviously difference among the 3 lines. Consistent with the prior studies the CFO 
may not be manipulated in order to avoid losses. 
3.5.2 Analysis on realization of managers’ forecasting  
  As mentioned before, I treat the managers’ forecasting disclosed in earnings 
briefing as the third kind of earnings benchmarks. Then, I begin to test H3 firstly 
with a similar distribution of earnings changes and earnings. The earnings forecasting 
based on annual forecast errors of sales, ordinary income and net income are 
displayed in Fig.7, Fig.8 and Fig.9. 
 
Fig.7. Sale  
 
Sales divided by Asset in last year. The distribution interval widths are 0.002. The 
range is from -0.08 to +0.08. 
 
 
34 
 
Fig.8. Ordinary Income 
 
Sales divided by Asset in last year. The distribution interval widths are 0.0002. The 
range is from -0.008 to +0.008. 
 
Fig.9. Net Income 
 
Sales divided by Asset in last year. The distribution interval widths are 0.0001. The 
range is from -0.04 to +0.04. 
  
From the histograms, it is clear that all the three kinds of FERRs are single peak 
distribution. There are extremely large numbers of firms’ FERRs are spread at just the 
right side of zero, including equal to zero. That is, based on the managers’ forecasting 
realization, there are too many firms just meeting or beating the forecasting earnings 
as I assumed in H3 visually. The table 3 shows the standardize differences test of 
earning realization about sales, ordinary income and net income respectively, focus on 
the intervals immediately close to zero. 
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Table 3 
 Sales Ordinary Profit Net Income 
Interval immediately left of 
0 
-41.161*** -33.721*** -35.945*** 
Interval immediately right 
of 0 
67.539*** 47.070*** 49.249*** 
***means significant at 0.01 level. 
 
From the findings, it is clear that the FERRs are significant discontinuous around 
zero which supports H3. There are two explanations for this phenomenon. First, the 
managers have plenty of internal information of the firm as an insider, thus the 
managers’ forecasting made by themselves are more exactly and with less bias. 
Second, according to the prior studies (Tanaka, 2004; Ota, 2006), the stock price 
would be effected immediately even there is a small negative earnings surprise, thus 
the manager would refer to manage the earnings to realize the forecast. The evidence 
shows that in Japan, managers’ forecasting plays a important role as the earnings 
benchmark. 
3.5.2.1 Accrual-based earnings management of managers’ forecasting 
With the considering of the second assuming above, I continue to investigate the 
FERRs by divided the firms into three groups around zero, to try to clarify the 
explanation of the abnormal distribution. As mentioned there are three forecasts 
subjects: sales, ordinary income and net income in the earnings briefing, so the 
FERRs are corresponding to the three forecasting values respectively. The first group, 
the group1, is the firms only with slight positive FERRs containing 1000 firms. I 
organize the group1 as followed: 1) ranked the FERR of sales, ordinary income and 
net income separately. 2) Excluding the firms with zero FERRs, count 1000 firm from 
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zero to positive direction. This group is the firms that present the firms just have slight 
positive earnings surprises. Say, the group1 is the group that just beating the managers’ 
forecasting. The next group is the firms with zero annual earnings surprises. That is 
the firms are just meeting the forecasting and the FERR is right equal to zero. Then, 
the last group is divided following the same way with group 1, but count 1000 firms 
from zero to negative direction instead. The group presents the firms just missing the 
mangers’ forecast with slight negative FERRs. 
For testing the H4, first, I examine the discretionary accruals among the three 
groups to understand that if the firms just meeting or bearing the managers’ forecast 
have relatively higher discretionary accruals and relatively lower discretionary 
accruals for firms just failure to realize the managers’ forecast. I proxy reporting 
management by discretionary accruals that estimated from the following two 
accrual-based earnings management models separately: 
 
Modified Jones Model: 
 
Total Accrualst/At-1=α+β11/At-1+β2 (∆REVt-∆RECt)/At-1+β3PPEt/At-1+εt 
 
Performance Matched Model regression-based approach (Kothari et al, 2005): 
 
Total Accrualst/At-1=α+β11/At-1+β2 (∆REVt-∆RECt)/At-1+β3PPEt/At-1+ 
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β4ROAt-1+εt1
 
 
Table 4 (Panel A) is the descriptive statistics of discretionary accrual measured by 
the cross-sectional regression models above, controlled the year and industry effects. 
Panel B to D show the descriptive statistics of the three suspected groups respectively. 
A closer look at the result shown in the table, it is quite clear that the highest 
discretionary accruals in the all sample firms is also appear in group1, that the group 
with small positive FERRs; and turn to the smallest discretionary accruals which 
reflect the firms maybe take a big-bath do not exist in any of the three groups. That is, 
at the certain extent, the group 1 firms have higher possibility than any other firms to 
engage in earnings management by accrual-based manipulation.  
 
Table 4 (Panel A) 
DA N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Modified Jones 10434 0.022 0.067 -1.524 2.583 
M-Jones with ROAt-1 10434 0.027 0.067 -1.527 2.524 
 
Table 4 (Panel B) Group 1 
(Panel B) Group 1 
DA N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Modified 
Jones 
1000 0.031 0.100 -0.319 2.583 
M-Jones with 
ROAt-1 
1000 0.039 0.099 -0.295 2.524 
(Panel C) Group 2 
DA N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Modified 
Jones 
577 .022 .064 -0.484 0.517 
M-Jones with 577 .031 .065 -0.456 0.505 
                                                   
1 Kothari et al. (2005) indicate the performance matched method is the best way to eliminate the 
bias of estimation, but as the suspected firms are the firms just beating the managers' forecasting, it 
is likely that firms with the nearest ROA also has same motivations, so I only use the ROA 
approached method. 
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ROAt-1 
(Panel D) Group 3 
DA N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Modified 
Jones 
1000 0.019 0.055 -0.300 0.437 
 
M-Jones with 
ROAt-1 
1000 0.027 0.057 -0.256 0.499 
 
To test for differences in the accrual-based earnings management among the three 
groups: small earnings surprises firms, just meeting the forecasts firms and slight 
negative earnings surprises firms, then, I conduct a regression controlling the 
variables that would affect the differences between every two groups. Specifically, I 
estimate the following year and industry fixed-effects model on discretionary accruals 
with the firms' FERRs near zero. As mentioned before, the group 1 contains 1000 
firms with slight positive FERRs. The group 2 is the firms with zero FERRs, as 
realization of forecasting net income, there are 577 observations; 453 samples just 
meet the forecasting ordinary income; and 575 firms meet the forecasting sales. The 
group 3 also contains 1000 observation with small negative FERRs. The regression is 
examining the earnings management by discretionary accruals between group 1 and 
group 3. Then, regress the same model with group 2 and group 3 again. There is the 
regression model as below: 
 
DA=α +β1Ylarger0 +β2New +β3Lnasset +β4Lev +β5CFO +β6Loss+β7Mtb +ε 
 
DA is the discretionary accruals calculated respectively from the two cross-sectional 
regression models above.  
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Ylarger0 presents the group 1-firms with small positive FERRs. In the first regression, 
it set to 1 if the firm belongs to group1, and 0 otherwise. In the second regression, it 
set to 1 if the firm belongs to group2, and 0 otherwise. 
New is the dummy variable set to 1 if the firm is newly listed within 2 year, and 0 
otherwise. 
Lnasset is the logarithm of asset. 
Lev is liabilities divided by asset. 
CFO is the cash flow divided by asset in t-1. 
Loss is set to 1 if loss, and 0 otherwise. 
Mtb is the market to book value. 
 
Table 5 presents the correlations among regression variables. I predict the 
coefficient of Ylarger0 should be positive. It means the firms just beating the forecasts 
have greater motivation to engage in earnings management than the firms just fail to 
realize the managers' forecasting. As the coefficient of New, it is expected to be 
positive. The newly listed firms have relatively higher discretionary accruals than 
other firms. Lev should be positive to discretionary accruals. According to prior study 
(Dechow et al. 1995), the coefficient of CFO should be negative to discretionary 
accruals. The coefficient of Loss should be negative that if the firm is facing a loss 
irreversible, it would not engage in upward earnings management, consistent with 
prior study (Brown, 2001). Mtb should have positive relationship with discretionary 
accruals (Matsumoto, 2002).  
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Table 6 provides summary statistics for the first regressions (regression on group 1 
and group 3) with robustness test. As shown in the table, the coefficient of group1, 
firms with slight positive FERRs of net income in annual report is positive and 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. With similarly regression on annual ordinary 
income and sales of group 1 and group 3, the coefficient of realization forecasting on 
ordinary income and sales are not significant. The result shows that the FERRs of 
ordinary income and sales are not related with discretionary accruals; and the relation 
between discretionary accruals and net income is significant. It makes sense the sales 
are not so correlate with discretionary accruals as net income. The result consistent 
with the study based on earnings changes and earnings above, the firms pay more 
attention on earnings which present as net income. The other control variables mostly 
conform to expect coefficients. Table 7 is the test between group 2 and group 3, 
examining on just meeting forecasting and small negative earnings surprise. The 
result is shown in table 7, but not as beating earnings forecasting, there is no 
significant differences between group 2 and group 3. That is, the empirical evidence 
does not meet the H5. 
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Table 5 
Correlation M-Jones 
DA 
M-Jones 
with 
ROAt-1 
Ynilarger
0 
New Lnasset Lev CFO Loss Mtb 
M-Jones DA 1.0000         
M-Jones with ROAt-1 0.9844 1.0000        
Ynilarger0 0.0434 0.0551 1.0000       
New 0.0490 0.0261 -0.0209 1.0000      
Lnasset 0.0110 0.0084  0.0337 -0.1070 1.0000     
Lev -0.0408 -0.0151 0.0552 0.0400 0.1622 1.0000    
CFO -0.6465 -0.7100 -0.0617 -0.0060 0.0870 -0.1895 1.0000   
Loss -0.2593 -0.2097 -0.0330 -0.0436 -0.1079 0.1956 -0.2536 1.0000  
Mtb 0.0238 -0.0300 -0.0036 0.0051 0.0137 0.0472 0.0413 0.0060 1.0000 
 
 
          Table 6 Group 1 and Group 3 
 Mergers’ forecasting subjects 
Net Income Ordinary Income Sale 
MJ-DA MJ-ROAt-1 MJ-DA MJ-ROAt-1 MJ-DA MJ-ROAt-1 
ynilarger0 0.003** 0.003**     
 (1.98) (2.06)     
yoilarger0   -0.002 -0.002   
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   (-1.07) (-1.20)   
ysalelarger0     0.002 0.002 
     (0.88) (1.13) 
new 0.017*** 0.010** 0.027** 0.015 0.020 0.013 
 (4.09) (2.47) (2.06) (1.26) (1.32) (1.03) 
lnasset 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002* 0.001 0.003** 0.002* 
 (4.37) (3.70) (1.70) (1.48) (2.18) (1.65) 
lev -0.037*** -0.022*** -0.032*** -0.020*** -0.036*** -0.024** 
 (-6.80) (-4.62) (-4.40) (-3.00) (-3.36) (-2.52) 
cfo -0.939*** -0.943*** -0.756*** -0.790*** -0.754*** -0.789*** 
 (-20.34) (-28.86) (-15.79) (-18.44) (-13.01) (-15.37) 
loss -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.051*** -0.064*** -0.061*** 
 (-22.82) (-22.52) (-22.61) (-22.21) (-21.20) (-21.28) 
mtb 0.001* 0.000* 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (1.94) (1.72) (1.55) (1.39) (1.59) (1.33) 
_cons 0.061*** 0.067*** 0.073*** 0.075*** 0.053*** 0.064*** 
 (6.38) (7.78) (5.78) (6.43) (2.97) (4.14) 
Year and industry effects are fixed 
N 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
R2 0.748 0.744 0.685 0.697 0.627 0.635 
T- statistics in parentheses is calculated based on the heterogeneous S.E., * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 7 
Group 2 and Group 3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 M-Jones ROAt-1 M-Jones ROAt-1 M-Jones ROAt-1 
 Net Income Ordinary Income Sale 
Yniequal0 0.003   
 (1.30)   
Yoiequal0  -0.002  
  (-0.76)  
Ysaleequal0   0.002 
   (0.74) 
New 0.019 0.009 -0.001 
 (1.33) (0.48) (-0.08) 
Lnasset 0.003*** 0.003** 0.004*** 
 (3.63) (2.44) (3.83) 
Lev -0.008 -0.018 -0.014 
 (-1.05) (-1.59) (-1.47) 
CFO -0.786*** -0.886*** -0.915*** 
 (-15.41) (-52.65) (-15.20) 
Loss -0.051*** -0.054*** -0.064*** 
 (-17.86) (-16.99) (-15.15) 
Mtb 0.000 0.002*** 0.001 
 (0.45) (4.01) (0.44) 
_cons 0.042** 0.049*** 0.054*** 
 (3.71) (3.07) (3.48) 
Year and industry effects are fixed 
N 1577 1453 1575 
R2 0.633 0.885 0.810 
T- statistics in parentheses is calculated based on the heterogeneous S.E., * p < 0.1, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
To test H6, I initially consider proxy for forecast realization. I focus on the 
realization of forecasting net income in annual report and semi-annual/the third 
quarterly report. I use forecasting net income scalded actual net income legalized in 
annual report as an approach, that if more firms realize the forecasting in annual 
report than semi-annual/the third quarterly report, the ratio of annual report should be 
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closer to 1. Table 8 shows the result of t-test of forecasting value/actual value in 
annual and semi-annual/the third quarterly report.  
 
Table 8 
Paired t-test 
Variable N Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev 95% Conf. Interval 
f/a NI 
semi-annual/the 
third quarterly  
12494 .991 .001 .093 .990 .993 
f/a NI annual 12494 .997 .001 .086 .996 .999 
diff 12494 -.006 .001 .123 -.008 -.004 
Mean (diff)=mean (f/a NI semi-annual/the third quarterly report-f/a NI annual report)                                                                           
t=-5.3160 
Ho: mean(diff) = 0 
 
The result shows that the ratio is much closer to 1 in annual report than in 
semi-annual report. It means the firms pay more attention to realize the forecasting in 
the annual report, which proves H6. 
3.5.2.2 Real activities earnings management of managers’ forecasting 
After the examination which based on accruals earning management, subsequent 
studies using the same metrics with prior research (Roychowdhury, 2006), I also 
estimate the following manipulation of real activities: increasing earnings by 
accelerating of the timing of sales through increased price discounts or more lenient 
credit terms, reducing the cost of goods sold by over producing inventory, and cutting 
discretionary expenditures, including R&D, advertising, and selling, general, and 
administrative(SG&A)expenditures. The former one is measured by the abnormal 
level of CFO, the second is estimated by the abnormal level of production costs, the 
last by the abnormal level of discretionary expenditures. The following study is using 
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these metrics to capture real activities manipulation. 
I express normal level of CFO as a linear function of sales and change in sales 
(Roychowdhury, 2006), and run the following cross-sectional regression for each 
industry and year: 
 
CFOt/At-1=α+β11/At-1+β2Salest/At-1+β3△Salest/At-1+εit 
 
Abnormal CFO is actual CFO minus the normal level of CFO calculated using the 
estimated coefficient from the regression above. At-1 is the total assets in year t-1; 
Salest is the sales in year t; and △Salest is the change in sales from year t-1 to t. The 
residual measured by upper regression represents the abnormal CFO. 
 I estimate the normal level of production costs following Roychowdhury (2006): 
 
PRODt/At-1=α+β11/At-1+β2Salest/At-1+β3△Salest/At-1+β3△Salest-1/At-1+εit 
 
where PRODt is the sum of the cost of goods sold in year t and the change in 
inventory from t-1 to t. △Salest-1 is the change in sales from year t-2 to t-1. The 
abnormal level of production costs is measured as the estimated residual from the 
regression above. The higher residual, the larger is the amount of inventory 
overproduction, and the greater is the increase in reported earnings through reducing 
the cost of goods sold. 
  Also following Roychowdhury (2006), I measure the normal level of discretionary 
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expenditures using the following equation: 
 
DISXt/At-1=α+β11/At-1+β2Salest-1/At-1+εit 
 
DISXt is the discretionary expenditures (the sum of R&D, advertising, and SG&A 
expenditures) in year t. I estimate all the above regressions by cross-sectional for 
industry-year with at least 7 observations, the total industries decreasing from 33 
industries to 31. I aggregate the three kinds of real earnings manipulation metrics into 
one proxy, RM, as the sum of the standardized variables all of them three, and report 
results corresponding to this proxy as well. Table9 reports the descriptive statistics of 
the variables estimated as the real earnings management. 
 
Table 9 
 
  Consistent with prior study (Zang, 2012) that managers probably use multiple 
techniques at the same time, I suppose the accrual-based and real activities earnings 
management may occur simultaneously to achieve the managers’ forecasting.  
  The following equations using the groups divided before as the suspect sample to 
estimate the real earnings management to realize the managers’ forecasting: 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ab_CFO 24680 -0.039 0.107 -3.620 4.166 
Ab_PRO
D 21031 0.126 0.225 -1.386 11.717 
Ab_DISX 24680 -0.036 0.102 -0.704 2.453 
RM 21031 0.048 0.143 -1.962 9.188 
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RM=α +β1Ylarger0 +β2Mtb +β3Size +β4ROA +β4△GDP +ε 
 
RM is the proxies measuring the real activities manipulation, that is abnormal CFO, 
abnormal production cost, abnormal discretionary expenditures respectively, and RM 
by taking their sum. Mtb is the market-to-book ratio to capture firms’ growth 
opportunities, that Barth et al. (1999) and Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that the 
incentive to report earnings increases is increasing with firms’ growth opportunities. 
Size is the industry-adjusted log value of total assets to control for relative firm size in 
industry. ROA used to control for the firm performance. △GDP is the change of GDP 
from year t-1 to year t. Following Cohen et al. (2008), I include △GDP as a proxy for 
real economic activity to control for the effect of economic activity on earnings 
management and fixed the year effect. 
 
Table 10 
Panel A 
 RM Ab_CFO Ab_PROD Ab_DISX 
nilarger0 0.002 -0.004 0.004 0.001 
 (0.49) (-1.36) (1.1) (0.43) 
mtb -0.000 0.001* -0.002*** 0.001 
 (-0.61) (1.93) (-3.38) (1.17) 
size 0.003 -0.002** 0.007** 0.001 
 (1.58) (2.05) (2.05) (0.87) 
roa 0.271*** 0.393*** -0.071 0.054* 
 (3.5) (8.03) (-0.81) (1.85) 
gdp 5.08E-06*** 2.03E-06*** -1.09E-06*** -1.15E-06*** 
 (5.7) (6.51) (-5.49) (-4.82) 
R2 0.220 0.055 0.098 0.155 
obs. 2000 2000 1895 2000 
 
Panel B 
 RM  RM 
oilarger0 -0.007* salelarger0 0.007* 
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 (-1.81)  (1.81) 
mtb -0.001* mtb 0.002 
 (-1.8)  (0.73) 
size 0.003 size 0.002 
 (1.32)  (0.98) 
roa 0.227** roa 0.075 
 (2.24)  (0.91) 
gdp 5.87E-06*** gdp 5.06E-06*** 
 (7.32)  (7.15) 
R2 0.247  0.166 
obs. 2000  2000 
*,**,*** means significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level. 
 
  Table 10 reports the summary statistics for the regressions (regression on group 1 
and group 3) with robustness test. I assume the managers’ forecasting of net income 
as the most important subject to present firms’ earnings, that consist with ordinary 
income and extraordinary income. The regressions are estimated on the realization of 
three forecast subjects separately. There are no significant correlations between 
group1 and group3 of real activities manipulation that divided on realization of net 
income. The three proxies of real earnings management are also not significant. As 
the other two subjects of managers’ forecast, the correlation on ordinary income 
between group1 and group3 are slightly negative significant. The correlation on sales 
of the two groups is slightly positive significant. That is, the group1, which with small 
positive FERRs have lower tendency engage to real earnings management to realize 
the forecasting ordinary income, which is opposite with my assumption. About the 
realization of forecasting sales, the group1 firms show higher inclination to apply real 
activities than group3. In generally speaking, the evidence of engaged in real earnings 
management between the suspect firms is not significant. Say, the firms that just 
beating the managers’ forecasting do not have relatively higher inclination to use real 
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earnings management. The results do not support the H7. It means the two metrics of 
earnings management do not existed simultaneously in suspect firms, and group1 
firms prefer to apply accrual-based earnings management than the real activities. 
  Considering about the relation between accrual-based and real earnings 
management, I also examine the relation using the flowing regression: 
 
DA= α +β1RM +β2RM_Ylarger0 +β3MTB +β4SIZE +ε 
 
where DA is the discretionary accruals estimated by Modified-Jones Model with 
ROAt-1, and I also divided the DA into positive and negative; RM is the proxy of real 
earnings management. RM_Ylarger0 is the intersection variable which the slope 
coefficient reflects whether the relationship between DA and RM are particularly 
strong in suspect firms. MTB is the market to book value and SIZE presents the log 
value of asset. 
 
Table 11 
 Raw_DA Positive_DA Negative_DA 
RM -0.156*** -0.121*** -0.026 
 (-7.05) (-5.22) (-1.54) 
RM_Ylarger0 -0.035 -0.052* -0.043* 
 (-1.43) (-1.78) (-1.73) 
mtb -0.000*** -0.000 -0.001*** 
 (-3.03) (-0.88) (-3.11) 
size 0.002*** -0.004*** 0.006*** 
 (2.65) (-5.28) (3.93) 
R2 0.144 0.123 0.048 
obs. 9431 7209 2402 
*,**,*** means significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level. 
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  Table11 reports the result based on the regression above. The finding shows that the 
negative relationship between DA (including raw value, positive and negative DA) 
and RM are consistently significant. Further, concerning the coefficient of intersection 
variable between RM and suspect firm dummy, it is shown that the relationship 
between DA and RM in these firms is particularly strong. Additionally, the two 
earnings management strategies, accrual-based and real activities manipulation are 
used as substitutes. 
 
4 Empirical results 
From the analyst above, it is clear that the avoidance of earnings decreases and 
losses are still existence and prevalence in Japan. According to the distributions of 
earnings changes and earnings, visual inspection mere strongly confirms the 
prediction that earnings changes and earnings slightly greater than zero occur more 
frequently than would be expected. Then the significant of the regularity near zero is 
confirmed by the statistical tests, that there are too many firms report small positive 
earnings, and too less firms report with slight negative earnings exercise. The 
evidence suggests that 17% to 25% of the firms with small earnings decreases 
exercise discretion to report earnings increases. Similarly, 75% to 76% of the firms 
with small negative earnings exercise discretion to report positive earnings. But 
comparing with these two kinds of earnings benchmarks, avoiding losses is more 
common than avoiding earnings decreases. 
Then I focus on avoidance of losses because the evidence from avoidance of losses 
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shows a more concentrated effect for management to avoid losses than fore 
management to avoid earnings decreases. I present three types of subjects about the 
manipulation of earnings to avoid losses. The three subjects are: working capital 
accrual, extraordinary items and operation cash flow. The evidence shows in working 
capital accrual indicate that the firms with slight positive earnings maybe manipulate 
the working capital to avoid losses. The evidence based on extraordinary items show 
that firms which already facing a heavy loss without possibility to reverse in the fiscal 
year, may tend to “take a big bath”. The operation cash flow shows no obviously 
relation with avoidance of losses. 
The paper pay more attention on the third kind of earnings benchmarks than former 
two, because the third one-managers’ forecasting is so different from other countries. 
It is the special data in Japanese market and convenient to be gotten by the investors 
and public, so the last sections are mainly on the detailed analysis of managers’ 
forecasting. As the beginning of the research on managers’ forecasting, I focus on the 
distributions of earnings surprises as former benchmarks. The distributions of 
earnings surprises contain a single- peaked, unusually high frequency of zero and 
small positive surprises like the former benchmarks. Next, I employ discretionary 
accruals estimated by two accrual-based models as the proxy for earnings 
management to detect the existing of earnings management to realize managers’ 
forecasting. The analyst about realization of managers’ forecasting is classified the 
firms in three groups which around zero. The evidences show that the firms with 
small positive FERRs have significant positive coefficient with discretionary accruals 
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than firms with small negative FERRs. In another word, the firms with slight positive 
FERRs engaged in earnings management more than the firms with slight negative 
earnings surprises. 
Next, based on the different time of disclosure, I examine the realization of 
forecasting in annual and semi-annual report. The findings suggest that the firms care 
more about the annual report than semi-annual report and there are more firms 
achieve the forecasting in the second half of the year. 
At last, I try to classify if the firms near zero earning surprises also engage in real 
earnings management to realize the forecasting and the relation between accrual 
–based and real earnings management. The examination of real earnings management 
shows that the firms with slight positive earnings surprises do not engage in real 
activities to realize the manager’ forecasting, comparing with the firms just missing 
the forecast. So it infers that the firms have much inclination to realize the forecasting 
by accrual-based earnings management than the real activities. On the next 
examination based on all firms’ samples, the evidence shows that the accrual-based 
and real earnings management as the two kinds of strategies are used as substitutes, 
that consistent with prior studies (Barton, 2001; Pincus and Rajgopal, 2002). 
 
5 Conclusions and future research 
I examine the three kinds of benchmarks in Japanese market. The evidence shows 
that firms avoid to earnings decreases and losses. And in recent years, comparing with 
the prior study, the phenomenon of avoiding earnings decreases is significant but not 
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such significant as avoiding loss. As one of the earning benchmarks, firms still try 
their best to avoid loss. To detect the third kind of earnings benchmarks, the managers’ 
forecasting is unique mandatory published forecasting with a long history and easily 
to be gotten. So, I assume that in Japan, the public treats the managers’ forecasting as 
the third kinds of earnings benchmarks, as similar as analysis forecasting in other 
countries. I predict the meeting or beating managers’ forecast management via 
comparison of three groups just equal to zero or nearby zero. The three groups present 
the firms with zero FERRs, small positive FERRs and small negative FERRs. The 
regression based on the discretionary accruals that small positive earnings surprises 
are more common than small negative earnings surprises. But within the comparison 
between the zero FERRs firms and small negative earnings surprises firms, there are 
no statistical significant differences. More importantly, I focus on the comparison 
between annual forecasting realization and semi-annual forecasting realization. The 
result shows more firms realize the forecasting in the annual report than the 
semi-report, that indicate the firms maybe treat the annual report more seriously than 
semi-annual report. On the examination of real earnings management, the suspect 
firms did not engage in realizing the forecasting through real earnings management. 
However, based on the full sample, I find these two ways are substitute.  
In future research, I continuously study on the earnings management based on the 
different kinds of benchmarks. In this study, I do not compare the frequencies of three 
earnings management based on the benchmarks. So, the comparison of different 
earnings benchmarks could be the coming issues. Moreover, as mentioned before, the 
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earnings briefings allowed to be revised several times in a year, so if the data is 
available, I could study on the revise of the forecasting earnings to clarify if the 
managers have motivations to modify their forecasting. Although, the result does not 
show the firms with slight positive earnings surprises engage more in real earnings 
management than other firms, but the trade-off between accrual-based and real 
activities is also existing and becoming a hot issue. There is rare research based on 
Asia countries till now, so it is also interesting to study on this topic considering the 
different costs by the methods. 
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